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Abstract  
This paper constructs a two-country DSGE model to study the nature of the recent financial 
crisis and its effects that spread immediately throughout the world owing to the globalization 
of banking. In the model, financial intermediaries (FIs) enter into chained credit contracts at 
home and abroad, engaging in cross-border lending to entrepreneurs by undertaking cross-
border borrowing from investors. The FIs as well as the entrepreneurs in two countries are 
credit constrained, so all of their net worths matter. Our model reveals that under FIs’ 
globalization, adverse shocks that hit one country affect the other, yielding business cycle 
synchronization  on both the real and financial sides. It also suggests that the FIs’ 
globalization, net worth shock, and credit constraints are key to understanding the recent 
financial crisis. 
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The recent ￿nancial crisis demonstrates the importance of a global linkage between the
￿nancial market, the ￿nancial system, and the real economy. The deterioration in the
U.S. subprime mortgage market impaired ￿nancial intermediaries￿(FIs￿ ) capital. Com-
bined with banking sector globalization, this led to the global malfunctioning of the
￿nancial market and the ￿nancial system, which weakened world demand. Figure 1
demonstrates those recent global downturns. GDP and investment dropped around 2007
not only in the United States but also in Japan and the euro area; in particular, in
Iceland and Ireland, we observe volatile changes in GDP and investment. That volatile
changes are accompanied by increasing ￿nancial globalization before the crisis. As the
right panels show, cross-border lending to those countries increased, with Iceland ex-
periencing particularly sharp rises by more than ￿ve times from 2005 to 2008.1 The
crisis caused cross-border lending to decline. Stock prices dropped in the major stock
exchange markets. That impaired FIs￿capital. FIs￿net worth deteriorated in the United
States, Japan, the euro area,2 and corporate bond spreads jumped in those areas.3 That
further decreased world GDP and investment, creating the adverse feedback loop. Stan-
dard macroeconomic models have not, however, captured those global linkage via FIs,
because FIs and the ￿nancial markets are treated as a veil.
In this paper, we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
to shed light on the nature of the recent ￿nancial crisis associated with its international
propagation under banking globalization. In particular, we investigate whether and un-
der which conditions our model yields a global economic downturn, as was observed in
the recent ￿nancial crisis. First, by constructing the model, we simulate responses of real
and ￿nancial variables to di⁄erent shocks, asking which shock is responsible for the recent
1Cross-border lending is de￿ned as consolidated claims on borrowers in the country or region con-
cerned. Its data are available from the Consolidated International Banking Statistics released by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Consolidated claims are those on an immediate borrower basis
and those of foreign claims. Claims on an immediate borrower basis identify counterparties according to
the country in which the immediate borrower is located. Foreign claims consist of cross-border claims,
local claims of foreign a¢ liates in foreign currency, and local claims of foreign a¢ liates in local currency.
Because we are interested in banking sector globalization, we use those statistics that report banks￿
international ￿nancial claims. Banks are categorized into each country by their nationalities on a
consolidated basis, including their head o¢ ces and all their branches, and netting of inter-o¢ ce accounts.
Those statistics are used to recognize the country-risk exposure of the major individual nationality
banking groups.
Consolidated claims in Europe include cross-border claims among European countries.
2FIs￿net worth is de￿ned as ￿ corporate equities + equity in the noncorporate business sector￿held
by the ￿nancial business sector. They are obtained from the Flow of Funds Accounts for the United
States and Japan, and the Euro Area Integrated Economic and Financial Accounts for the Euro area.
3Corporate bond spreads are di⁄erences between corporate bond rates and government bond rates.
2global economic downturn. Second, we ask whether globalization enhances business cycle
synchronization, simulating economic responses under varying degrees of globalization.
Third, we ask whether credit frictions, in particular, the presence of credit-constrained
FIs, enhance business cycle synchronization, comparing our model with one that omits
FIs￿credit constraint. Finally, we draw implications for various policy measures, dis-
cussing the e⁄ects of monetary, capital injection, and macroprudential policies on the
￿nancial market and the real economy at home and abroad.
In the model, FIs enter into chained credit contracts at home and abroad. Following
Hirakata, Sudo, and Ueda (2009, 2010, HSU), the credit contracts are vertically chained
between investors and FIs and between FIs and entrepreneurs. The context of the credit
contract is based on the ￿nancial accelerator model by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999, BGG). Unlike BGG, FIs are credit-constrained, as are entrepreneurs. In this
paper, the HSU model is extended to a two-country model. Under banking globalization,
FIs undertake cross-border lending to entrepreneurs through cross-border borrowing from
investors. FIs as well as entrepreneurs in two countries are credit constrained, so all of
their net worths in￿ uence the cost-of-funds for the entrepreneurs and, in turn, the real
economy in the two countries.
The global chained credit contracts and the presence of the credit-constrained FIs pro-
duce a new channel of business cycle synchronization. Consider, for example, an adverse
shock, which leads to a decrease in FIs￿net worth. Under banking globalization, the FIs
supply funds to entrepreneurs in the two countries; the adverse shock thus decreases the
loans in both countries, and investment and output decrease simultaneously. Such a new
channel does not arise, unless we consider credit-constrained FIs. This common lender
e⁄ect has been shown empirically by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2003). Figure 2 and Table 1 provide supporting evidence. Figure 2 plots the
relation between cross-border lending to OECD countries (except for Luxemburg) before
the crisis and GDP changes in those countries during the crisis. This ￿gure and simple
regression, reported in Table 1, suggest that countries with larger cross-border lending
tended to be more severely a⁄ected by the recent crisis.4
This paper reveals, ￿rst, that under banking globalization, adverse shocks that hit
one country a⁄ect the other, yielding business cycle synchronization on both the real
and ￿nancial sides. An adverse productivity shock and a tighter monetary policy shock
in one country reduce GDP, investment, and asset prices in the other country. For the
productivity shock, however, cross-border lending increases and risk premiums decrease
4Considering country-speci￿c di⁄erences, we look at not only the level of cross-border lending during
2006Q4 but also changes in cross-border lending from 2002Q4 to 2006Q4.
3in the foreign country, which is not observed in the recent ￿nancial crisis. An adverse
shock to FIs￿net worth in one country not only simultaneously reduces GDP, invest-
ment, and asset prices in the other, but also reduces cross-border lending and raises risk
premiums. In this respect, the adverse shock to FIs￿net worth is key to understanding
the recent ￿nancial crisis.5
Second, banking globalization enhances business cycle synchronization. For a shock to
FIs￿net worth, without banking globalization, no business cycle synchronization occurs; a
bilateral correlation for GDP is slightly negative. Under banking globalization, business
cycles are synchronized, and as globalization intensi￿es the degree of business cycle
synchronization increases signi￿cantly. In this respect, FIs￿globalization is also key to
understanding the recent ￿nancial crisis.
Third, business cycle synchronization is enhanced, compared with a standard BGG
model in which FIs are not credit constrained. The presence of credit-constrained FIs
works to enhance the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect, as is pointed out by HSU (2009). Un-
der banking globalization, the common lender e⁄ect also contributes to an increase in
business cycle synchronization. In a standard two-country BGG model, because FIs are
not credit constrained, a shock to FIs￿net worth has no e⁄ect on the economy, and there
is no common lender e⁄ect. In our model, on the other hand, because FIs are credit
constrained, an adverse shock to FIs￿net worth in one country raises the cost-of-funds in
two countries, dampening GDP and investment. As a result, the e⁄ect of globalization
on business cycle synchronization is much greater than that in the standard two-country
BGG model. In this respect, FIs￿credit constraint likewise is key to understanding the
recent ￿nancial crisis.
Lastly, our study suggests that under globalization, policy in one country has a
global impact. Accommodative monetary policy and capital injection policy to FIs in
one country are e⁄ective in boosting GDP and investment in the other country.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
related literature and stylized facts. Section 3 presents a two-country sticky price model
in which both FIs and entrepreneurs are credit constrained. Section 4 shows the model￿ s
simulation results. Section 5 concludes.
5This account is consistent with HSU (2010) and Perri and Quadrini (2010). Perri and Quadrini
(2010) point to the importance of the credit shock. Our paper further argues that among the credit
shocks, the shock to the FI sector is important. An opposing view exists, however. For example, Chari,
Christiano, and Kehoe (2008) cast a doubt on the detrimental e⁄ect of ￿nancial market disruptions on
investment by pointing out that non￿nancial ￿rms￿retained earnings are greater than investment.
42 Related Literature and Stylized Facts
In this section, we provide an overview of related literature and stylized facts on three
points: (1) business cycle synchronization; (2) macroeconomic e⁄ects of FIs; and (3)
globalization. First, we check the presence of business cycle synchronization and review
theoretical studies that have sought to explain business cycle synchronization. Second,
we introduce empirical studies on the e⁄ect of FIs￿credit conditions, and theoretical
studies on their implications from a macroeconomic perspective. Third, we examine the
evolution of globalization from the viewpoints of trade and ￿nancial openness.
2.1 Business Cycle Synchronization
In Figure 1, we showed the evidence of global downturns in the recent ￿nancial crisis. In
the United States, Japan, and Europe, in particular, in Iceland and Ireland, economic
activity such as GDP and investment weakened; cross-border lending contracted; asset
prices dropped; FIs￿net worth deteriorated; and corporate bond spreads jumped.
To examine business cycle synchronization for longer periods, we calculate bilateral
correlations for GDP and investment in the G7 countries. GDP and investment data
are detrended with the Hodrick￿ Prescott ￿lter with ￿=1,600. Tables 2 to 4 report the
results. We ￿nd that correlations are positive in most cases.6 Bilateral correlations for
GDP (investment) between the United States and Japan are 0.23 (0.29) for the sample
of 1970Q1 to 2008Q4. Table 4 reports changes in bilateral correlations for GDP between
three major countries: the United States, Japan, and Germany. The full sample, 1970Q1
to 2008Q4, is divided into four subsamples: the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. In the
1990s, GDP correlations are negative between the United States and Japan and between
the United States and Germany.7 In the 2000s, GDP correlations are the highest. The
GDP correlation between the United States and Japan is 0.81 in the 2000s, jumping up
from 0.23 for the full sample.
Theoretically, business cycle synchronization has been regarded as a correlation puzzle
or a quantity puzzle since Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, BKK). BKK constructed
a standard international real business cycle model, and pointed out that their model
predicted a negative correlation for output and investment. The reason is that in response
to a productivity shock it is e¢ cient to increase investment and the labor supply in the
more productive country and reduce them in the less productive one. The bilateral
6See Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, 1994), Frankel and Rose (1998), and Ambler, Cardia, and
Zimmermann (2004).
7Heathcote and Perri (2004) point out decreases in bilteral correlations from 1972￿ 1986 to 1986￿ 2000.
5correlations for output and investment thus become negative or close to zero.
Motivated by BKK, a number of papers have tackled the correlation puzzle and
demonstrated that frictions in the ￿nancial markets resolve the puzzle.8 For example,
Faia (2007) extended the ￿nancial accelerator model by BGG to a two-country model,
and showed that her model predicted positive output correlations.9
Existing DSGE models are, however, still unable to explain the synchronized move-
ments in various variables such as the decrease in cross-border lending and the rise in
corporate bond spreads. In most of those models, the deterioration in FIs￿net worth
plays no economic role. Furthermore, Faia (2007) argues that ￿nancial globalization
weakens business cycle synchronization, although many empirical studies report that
such business cycle synchronization is enhanced.10
2.2 Financial Intermediaries
The main contribution of this paper is to construct a two-country DSGE model that
explicitly incorporates credit-constrained FIs. Without FIs￿credit constraint, a dete-
rioration in FIs￿net worth does not have any economic impact. This eliminates an
important spillover channel, which gives rise to what is often called the common lender
e⁄ect, arising when borrowers in multiple countries have a common lender. In such a
case, an adverse shock in one country worsens the credit conditions of FIs, which causes a
withdrawal of funds from another country; it thus explains positive bilateral correlations.
Several empirical studies support the existence of the common lender e⁄ect.11
The recent ￿nancial crisis and ample empirical studies suggest that declines in FIs￿
net worth generate a macroeconomic downturn.12 For example, Peek and Rosengren
8See BKK (1994), Baxter and Crucini (1995), Heathcote and Perri (2002, 2004), Kehoe and Perri
(2002), Iacovielloa and Minetti (2006), Faia (2007), Dedola and Lombardo (2009), Devereux and Yetman
(2009), and Perri and Quadrini (2010). Dedola and Lombardo (2009) and Devereux and Yetman (2009)
calculate the optimal portfolio of investors using the second-order approximation. Dedola and Lombardo
(2009) yield negative output correlations. As the ￿nancial friction, they introduce the BGG model as
in Faia (2007), but assume that capital goods in two countries are tradable, unlike in Faia (2007).
Devereux and Yetman (2009) do not report output correlations, but report positive correlations for
asset holdings. As the ￿nancial friction, they introduce the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model. Their
model abstracts from nominal stickiness, and keep total assets and labor ￿xed. As another reason for
the positive bilateral correlation, Kose and Yi (2006) and Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2008) point out
complementarity between products.
9See also Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) for the BGG model extended to an small open
economy model.
10See Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003), Morgan, Strahan, and Rime (2004), and Imbs (2004, 2006).
In contrast, Heathcote and Perri (2004) report opposing results from both empirical and theoretical
sides.
11See Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003).
12See Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), Calomiris and Mason (2003), Anari, Kolari, and Mason
6(1997, 2000) identify a loan supply shock that is speci￿c to Japanese banks but external
to the U.S. credit market using panel data, and report that the worsening of FIs￿credit
conditions generates a macroeconomic downturn.
Theoretically, our model is the extension of the ￿nancial accelerator model of HSU
(2009, 2010) to a two-country model. The HSU model is built upon the BGG model. In
contrast to BGG, however, there are two credit-constrained borrowers, FIs and entrepre-
neurs. Shocks to the FI sector as well as those to the entrepreneurial sector are ampli￿ed
and propagated to the aggregate ￿ uctuations, through endogenous developments in the
net worth in the FI sector and the entrepreneurial sector.13
2.3 Globalization
It is often pointed out that increasing globalization was behind the recent crisis, which
enhanced business cycle synchronization. Accordingly, we examine whether there was
an increase in globalization before the onset of the ￿nancial crisis. The literature on the
wave of globalization both in goods and ￿nancial markets is voluminous.14
Figure 3 illustrates globalization in the goods market. As a proxy for trade openness,
the ￿gure demonstrates the movements of (exports + imports)/2 as a share of GDP for
the United States, Japan, Germany, and the euro area from 1970. In the United States,
we observe a steady increase in trade openness. In Japan, Germany, and the euro area,
we observe an accelerated increase in trade openness from the middle of the 1990s.15
Figures 4 to 6 illustrate globalization in the ￿nancial market. Using BIS￿ s Consol-
idated International Banking Statistics, we report cross-border lending in the form of
consolidated claims on borrowers in the United States, Japan, Europe, and developing
countries from 1999 to 2009 in Figure 4. The top panel indicates the level of consolidated
claims; the middle panel indicates the ratio of consolidated claims to nominal GDP at
(2005), Ashcraft (2005).
13The HSU model is constructed with reference to two lines of literature. The ￿rst strand focuses
on the credit friction associated with the entrepreneurs (BGG; Kiyotaki and Moore [1997], Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno [2004]). The second strand considers the credit friction of the FIs (Bernanke
and Blinder [1988], Goodfriend and McCallum [2007], Van den Heuvel [2008], Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and
Signoretti [2008], Dib [2009], Curdia and Woodford [2009], Gertler and Karadi [2009], Gertler and
Kiyotaki [2010]). In considering the two types of frictions above, our model is close to the model by
Chen (2001), Aikman and Paustian (2006), and Meh and Moran (2004), who use quantitative extensions
of the model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
14See, for example, Crafts (2000), Eichengreen (2001), Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson (2003), Edison,
Klein, Ricci, and Slok (2004), Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), Kose, Prasad, Rogo⁄, and Wei (2006), and
Goldberg (2009).
15As for longer records of trade openness, see Findlay and O￿ Rourke (2003) and originally Maddison
(1995, 2001).
7the end of the calendar year; and the bottom panel indicates the ratio of consolidated
claims to non-￿nancial ￿rms￿total liabilities. We ￿nd that consolidated claims, both
in their level and in their ratios, increased over the sample periods, outstandingly in
Europe. It suggests increasing risk exposures in the countries examined. For the United
States in 2009, the ratio of consolidated claims to nominal GDP (non-￿nancial ￿rms￿
total liabilities) reaches 40 (15) percent. Figure 5 decomposes consolidated claims on the
non-bank private sector and banks.16 Again, we observe increases in consolidated claims,
both on the non-bank private sector and banks.17 Figure 6 demonstrates the movements
of the ratio of cross-border fund-raising to total fund-raising using the Flow of Funds
Accounts compiled by the Bank of Japan. The statistics report a reference table, Chan-
nels of Fund-Raising by the Non￿nancial Sector. The cross-border fund-raising is the
sum of fund-raising by the domestic non￿nancial sector via overseas markets and by the
overseas sector. The ratio of cross-border fund-raising increases from 1979. In 2008, in
particular, the ratio of cross-border fund-raising reached 23 percent largely re￿ ecting the
increase in fund-raising by the overseas sector.18
3 Model
We consider a two-country economy with credit and goods markets. Two countries are
of equal size. The economy in each country consists of 10 types of agents: a household,
investors, FIs, entrepreneurs, capital goods producers, ￿nal goods producers, retail goods
producers, wholesale goods producers, the monetary authority, and the government.
In this section, we brie￿ y describe the main properties of the model. See Appendix
A and B for details.
3.1 Credit Market
Our setting for the credit market is taken from HSU (2009, 2010). As shown in Figure 7,
investors, FIs, and entrepreneurs make chained credit contracts. FIs own their net worth,
but not su¢ ciently to ￿nance the loans to the entrepreneurs. Consequently, FIs make
16The ￿gures report not foreign claims but international claims. International claims equal foreign
claims minus local claims of foreign a¢ liates in local currency.
17Those upward trends are con￿rmed in longer-term data using the BIS Locational International
Banking Statistics. They report international ￿nancial claims of banks resident in a given country.
18While the Flow of Funds Accounts show a clear increase in banking globalization in Japan, the
previous BIS statistics do not. Such a di⁄erence can be explained, because the overseas non-￿nancial
sector in the Flow of Funds Accounts corresponds to the non-￿nancial sector outside Japan. If that
sector is resident in the United States, the BIS statistics classify the cross-border lending not as the one
to Japan but as the one to the United States.
8credit contracts with investors to borrow the rest of the funds (hereafter IF contracts).
Entrepreneurs are the ultimate borrowers of the funds. They also own their net worth,
but not su¢ ciently to ￿nance their projects. Hence, the entrepreneurs engage in the
credit contract with the FIs, to ￿nance the rest of the funds (hereafter FE contracts).
There are two sources of informational asymmetry in the IF contract and in the FE
contract. This makes both FIs and entrepreneurs credit constrained. The model of
credit frictions is based on the costly state veri￿cation model developed by BGG. In the
two-country model, the chained credit contracts are depicted as Figure 8. Under banking
globalization, FIs undertake cross-border lending to entrepreneurs through cross-border
borrowing from investors. Because many notations are used, this ￿gure summarizes
variables and parameters in the credit markets. The left (right) panel represents the
home (foreign) country. Superscripts F and E denote FIs and entrepreneurs, respectively.
Subscripts H and F denote the country of the FIs with credit connections. The asterisk
(￿) indicates a variable in the foreign country.
In the FE contract, each type-i FI in the home country monopolistically o⁄ers a loan
contract to group-ji entrepreneurs in the home and foreign countries. Each entrepreneur
in group ji in the home country owns net worth NE (st): It uses 1￿￿E
H of the net worth to
purchase capital of (1￿￿E
H)Q(st)KH (st), where Q(st) is the price paid to capital in units
of the household consumption index; (1￿￿E
H)KH (st) is the quantity of capital purchased
by a group-ji entrepreneur; and st is state of the economy in period t. The type-i
FI thus invests in the loans to group-ji entrepreneurs in the home country an amount
(1￿￿E
H)(Q(st)KH (st)￿NE (st)): Similarly, the type-i FI invests in the loans to group-ji
entrepreneurs in the foreign country an amount ￿E
F(Q￿ (st)K￿
H (st)￿NE￿ (st)): Following
BGG, we assume that entrepreneurs are subject to an idiosyncratic productivity shock
and the FE contract has the costly state veri￿cation structure. The FE contract speci￿es
a cut-o⁄ value of idiosyncratic shock such that entrepreneurs repay their debt if their
idiosyncratic productivity is greater than the cut-o⁄ value and they declare the default
otherwise. If the default is declared, FIs pay a monitoring costs to observe entrepreneurial
realized returns, and the default entrepreneurs receive nothing.
In the IF contract, investors lend the loans to a continuum number of FIs. Each
type-i FI in the home country owns the net worth NF (st): The type-i FI then borrows
the rest from investors in the home country by a portion of 1 ￿ ￿F
H and investors in the
foreign country by a portion of ￿F
H. The type-i FI is subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shock. The IF contract has the same costly state veri￿cation structure as does the FE
contract, whereas FIs now need to act as the borrowers rather than lenders.




F represent exogeneous degrees of banking
9globalization or ￿nancial openness, which determines the allocation of ￿nance between
the home country and the foreign country. Put di⁄erently, ￿F
H and ￿F
F capture the
degree of banking globalization from FIs￿borrowing side, or the ￿nancial openness of the
interbank market, and ￿E
H and ￿E
F capture the degree of banking globalization from FIs￿
lending side or the ￿nancial openness of foreign direct investment.
For a given risk-free rate of rerurn R(st) in the home country, the external ￿nance
premium EtfRE


























H (st+1)g is called cost-of-funds. The cost-of-funds plays an important role in invest-
ment. Higher cost-of-funds lowers the price of capital Q, and discourages investment. In
BGG, the external ￿nance premium is decreasing in the entrepreneurial net worth ratio.
In HSU, FIs as well as entrepreneurs are credit constrained, and the external ￿nance
premium is decreasing in both FIs￿and entrepreneurial net worth ratios. In our model,
the external ￿nance premium depends on four net worth ratios: FIs￿and entrepreneurial
net worth ratios in the two countries. We investigate numerically how each net worth
a⁄ects the external ￿nance premium in the next section. Under banking globalization
(￿ > 0); the external ￿nance premium is decreasing in the four net worth ratios.
The net worths of FIs and entrepreneurs depend on their earnings from the credit
contracts and their labor income. Following Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), we consider
net worth shocks de￿ned as once-and-for-all changes in the FI￿ s and entrepreneurial net
worths.
3.2 Goods Market
For the setup of the goods market, we follow the two-country model of BKK (1992, 1994),
and its sticky price extension by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and Faia (2007). Final
goods produced in two countries are di⁄erent and tradable; labor and physical capital
are immobile; bond markets, implicit in the model, are complete. Consumption goods in
each country are produced by the ￿nal goods producers using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggrega-
tor of di⁄erentiated retail goods. These retail goods are produced by the monopolistic
producers who set Calvo-type sticky prices, using the wholesale goods. The wholesale
goods are produced by the competitive ￿rms converting capital and labor inputs. Capital
19To be more precise, the external ￿nance premium depends on other variables such as the real
exchange rate and the risk-free rate in the foreign country.
10goods are supplied by entrepreneurs, and labor inputs are supplied by household, FIs,
and entrepreneurs.


















where CH (st) and CF (st) denote the consumption of home-produced goods spent in the
home country and the consumption of foreign-produced goods spent in the home country,
respectively.
Trade openness is captured by ￿H: The parameter ￿H represents the weight on foreign-
produced goods. Similarly, we de￿ne the weight on home-produced goods in the foreign
country as ￿F. Those parameters indicate the inverse degree of a home bias.
4 Simulation
4.1 Calibration
We follow HSU and originally BGG for parameter values. The parameter values are
symmetric in two countries. See Appendix C for details.
Regarding the parameters of the two-country model, six parameters capture economic
openness. First, we set ￿ = ￿H = ￿F = 0:15 in the benchmark. ￿H and ￿F represent
trade openness in the home and foreign countries. As de￿ned in equation (2), the pa-
rameter ￿H represents the weight on foreign produced goods. If it is zero, there is no
demand for the foreign goods; this implies no trade of goods. If it is 0.5, there is no home
bias. A household in the home country demands equally for the home-produced goods
and foreign-produced goods, provided that their prices are the same. Following Faia
(2007), we set them at 0.15 in the benchmark. That value is consistent with the data
for the United States and Japan. As Figure 3 shows, trade in those countries accounts
for 15 percent of total GDP. A trade share for Europe is higher, reaching more than 30
percent. That partly re￿ ects active cross-border trade among European countries.
Second, we set ￿F = ￿F
H = ￿F
F = 0 and ￿E = ￿E
H = ￿E
F = 0 in the benchmark for
the parameters of banking globalization or ￿nancial openness. It is di¢ cult to measure
the actual degree of banking globalization that matches our model, but Figures 4 to 6
provide some clues. The bottom panel of Figure 4 indicates the ratio of foreign claims to
non-￿nancial ￿rms￿total liabilities; the latter corresponds to entrepreneurial total assets,
QK; in our model. If foreign claims are all debts and two countries are symmetrical,
11foreign claims correspond to ￿E(QK￿NE)+￿F(QK￿NE￿NF) in our model. Therefore,










According to Figure 4, the latest ratios are about 15 percent for the United States, 10
percent for Japan, and 35 percent for the euro area. Because actual foreign claims are
not all debts, those ratios give the upper limit of ￿E and ￿F: Distribution between ￿E
and ￿F is illustrated by Figure 5, which decomposes foreign claims to those on the non-
bank private sector and on banks. For the United States, foreign claims on the non-bank
private sector are twice as large as those on banks. It suggests ￿E > ￿F: On the contrary,
for Japan and Europe, foreign claims on the non-bank private sector is lower than those
on banks. It suggests ￿E < ￿F: Finally, Japan￿ s ￿E is demonstrated in Figure 4 as
fund-raising by the domestic non-￿nancial sector via overseas markets; it is 3.5 percent
in 2008.
4.2 Net Worth and Cost-of-Funds





for entrepreneurs in the home and the foreign country. To begin with, we focus on the
partial equilibrium only of the credit market.20
For varying FIs￿ and entrepreneurial net worth ratios in the foreign country, we
calculate how cost-of-funds moves. In Figure 9, the top (bottom) two panels indicate
changes in the premiums to FIs￿(entrepreneurial) net worth ratios in the foreign country.
Net worth ratios, NF￿=Q￿K￿ or NE￿=Q￿K￿, deviate from the steady state by ￿0:05 to
0.05. The two left (right) panels indicate changes in the cost-of-funds in the home
(foreign) country.
Without banking globalization, the e⁄ect of net worth on cost-of-funds is limited
to the country concerned. In Figure 9, black lines with a plus symbol indicate the
20In the general equilibrium, equation (26) makes entrepreneurial returns to capital in the home
country obtained by ￿nancing funds from FIs in the home country RE
H (st) equal those obtained by
￿nancing funds from FIs in the foreign country RE
F (st): In the partial equilibrium, because equation















and analyze changes in RE ￿
st+1jst￿
: Similarly, we analyze RE￿ ￿
st+1jst￿
; average entrepreneurial cost-
of-funds in the foreign country.
12case without banking globalization (￿ = ￿F = ￿E = 0). Both FIs and entrepreneurs
borrow funds from agents in their resident country. Lines in the two left panels are ￿ at,
suggesting that without banking globalization the cost-of-funds in the home country is
independent of net worth in the foreign country. The two right panels suggest that as net
worth in the foreign country decreases, the cost-of-funds in the foreign country increases.
The increase in the cost-of-funds is steeper in response to a change in FIs￿net worth
than to a change in entrepreneurial net worth. This is consistent with HSU. This arises
from the fact that FIs￿net worth is smaller than entrepreneurial net worth in the United
States.
Those results do not change when the interbank (FIs￿borrowing) markets are open.
Blue lines with circles indicate the case in which FIs borrow half of their funds from the
other country (￿F = 0:5). The lines are identical to the black lines with a plus symbol.
In the partial equilibrium, because the risk-free rates in the two countries are the same
and the real exchange rate does not change, FIs are indi⁄erent between borrowing funds
from the home country and borrowing funds from the foreign country.
When FIs￿lending markets are open, a change in net worth in the home country
a⁄ects cost-of-funds in the foreign country, and mitigates a change in cost-of-funds in
the home country. Red lines with dots indicate the case in which entrepreneurs borrow
half of their funds from the other country (￿E = 0:5). As FIs￿net worth in the foreign
country decreases, cost-of-funds in the home country increases, as the top-left panel
demonstrates. Entrepreneurs in the foreign country borrow a portion of funds from the
FIs in the home country, and their ￿nancial conditions are constant. That mitigates
an increase in cost-of-funds in the foreign country, as the top-right panel demonstrates.
Entrepreneurial net worth also in￿ uences cost-of-funds in the other country. This is
illustrated by the bottom-left panel. From investors￿viewpoint in the home country, the
worsening of the entrepreneurial net worth in the foreign country enhances the agency
cost problem. This increases the cost-of-funds in the home country. On the other hand,
from investors￿viewpoint in the foreign country, the entrepreneurial net worth in the
home country stays constant. This mitigates a change in the cost-of-funds in the foreign
country.
4.3 Impulse Responses
The previous cost-of-funds curves are drawn using a partial equilibrium framework. Some
key variables are kept ￿xed. Model dynamics are neglected, such as developments in net
worth and the price of capital.
13In the following exercises, we compute the equilibrium response of the economy to
shocks in a general equilibrium framework. We study four types of adverse shocks: (i)
a productivity shock; (ii) a monetary policy shock; (iii) a net worth shock in the FI
sector; and (iv) a net worth shock in the entrepreneurial sector. The last two shocks,
(iii) and (iv), are the sectoral shocks that hit each of the participants in the credit market.
For those shocks, we introduce an innovation either in equation (15) or (16); following
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002).
Our particular focus is on bilateral correlations for macroeconomic variables, namely,
GDP and investment. In the following ￿gures, we show responses of GDP and investment
to shocks, and examine whether a shock in one country yields a similar response of GDP
and investment in the other country. To analyze the ￿nancial accelerator channel, we
also present responses of net worth ratios in two countries. The net worth ratios are the
ratio of the sum of FIs￿and entrepreneurial net worth (N = NF + NE) to total assets
(QK). The left (right) panels demonstrate the economic variables in the home (foreign)
country. Finally, the real exchange rate is demonstrated in the bottom-left panel.
For comparison with our chained credit contract model (hereafter, CCC model), we
also simulate a ￿BGG model.￿In the BGG model, entrepreneurs are credit-constrained,
but FIs are not. The FI sector is dropped from the CCC model, and the investors and
entrepreneurs make direct credit contracts. Because there is no agency problem associated
with the FIs, the FIs￿net worth plays no role. Thus, the external ￿nance premium re￿ ects
only the entrepreneurial net worth. Consequently, the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect of the
BGG model comes only from the entrepreneurial sector.21
4.3.1 Benchmark (No Banking Globalization)
As our benchmark, we simulate economic responses of GDP, investment, net worth ratios,
and the real exchange rate in the economy of ￿ = 0:15 and ￿ = ￿F = ￿E = 0: FIs do not
engage in either cross-border lending or borrowing.
Productivity shock Figure 10 illustrates economic responses to a negative produc-
tivity shock in the home country. We consider the productivity shock that decreases
the productivity of wholesale goods-producing sector by one percent at the impact, and
21We set parameter values related to the entrepreneurial sector in our BGG model to the same values
used in our baseline model. Thus, we set the values of ￿E; ￿E; and nE the same across the two models.
Furthermore, we choose the same steady-state return to capital RE for the two models. We choose to
do so because we aim to compare the models￿dynamics in a similar economic environment with respect
to aggregate investment. Our choice yields the recalibrated values of ￿E and R for the BGG model,
which di⁄er from the baseline model.
14returns to the steady-state level with the autoregressive parameter of 0.85.
We ￿nd business cycle synchronization with respect to GDP and investment. As the
left panels shows, in the home country GDP and investment decrease. Because produc-
tivity decreases, real marginal costs increase, and in￿ ation rates rise. That raises nominal
interest rates and lowers the real exchange rate, indicating home currency appreciation.
In the foreign country, we observe a fall in GDP and investment. GDP and investment
exhibit positive bilateral correlations in the two countries. This ￿nding is consistent
with Faia (2007). As she explains, the credit market friction as well as nominal stick-
iness plays a key role. The adverse productivity shock raises the real marginal costs
and increases in￿ ation rates in the home country. Demand shifts from home-produced
goods to foreign-produced goods raises in￿ ation rates in the foreign country. In response,
foreign monetary policy is tightened, deteriorating net worth. That raises cost-of-funds,
which in turn decreases GDP and investment in the foreign country.
Compared with the BGG model, our CCC model reports greater responses of GDP
and investment in the foreign country. The total impacts of two countries are greater
in the CCC model than those in the BGG model, also. That result is consistent with
HSU (2009), which points out that the CCC model enhances the ￿nancial accelerator
e⁄ect. In the home country, the responses of GDP and investment are almost equal.
This is because the economy￿ s response to nominal interest rates is larger in the CCC
model than in the BGG model, but the economy￿ s response to the productivity shock is
almost the same in the two models. Since GDP and investment in the foreign country
drop more, bilateral correlations of those variables become larger in the CCC model than
those in the BGG model.
Monetary policy shock Figure 11 illustrates economic responses to the tightening
monetary policy shock in the home country. We consider a case where the nominal
interest rate rises unexpectedly by 0.25 percent (one percent annually) at the impact.
We again ￿nd business cycle synchronization with respect to GDP and investment.
A rise in the nominal interest rate in the home country increases the real interest rate,
causing investors￿opportunity cost to rise. Net worth worsens, and investment falls.
Due to a rise in the nominal interest rate, the real exchange rate drops, implying home
currency appreciation. In the foreign country, GDP and investment decrease due to
two channels. First, a decrease in demand caused by the increase in the real interest
rate lowers demand for foreign-produced goods as well as home-produced goods. In the
foreign country, this lowers returns to capital, deteriorating net worth and dampening
GDP and investment. Second, because the home currency appreciates, there occurs a
15shift of demand from home-produced goods to foreign-produced goods. In the foreign
country, it increases in￿ ation rates, inducing monetary tightening. Net worth worsens,
and GDP and investment decrease.
Compared with the BGG model, our CCC model reports greater responses of GDP
and investment in the two countries. The CCC model enhances the ￿nancial accelerator
e⁄ect due to the presence of credit-constrained FIs.
FIs￿net worth shock Figure 12 illustrates economic responses to a negative shock of
FIs￿net worth in the home country. We consider a case in which FIs￿net worth declines
by one percent of the steady-state GDP. Although the shock to the net worth is a one-
time shock and therefore has no inertia, its impacts on the economy are persistent. That
is, as the demand for capital goods is weakened, the capital price falls, leading to a further
decrease in the investment owing to the endogenous declines in the entrepreneurial net
worth as well as the FIs￿net worth.
GDP and investment are not synchronized. Responding to the decline in FIs￿net
worth in the home country, cost-of-funds increases, and GDP and investment decrease.
De￿ ation occurs, which lowers nominal interest rates. The real exchange rate increases,
indicating home currency depreciation. In the foreign country, GDP and investment
increase, because the home country experiences de￿ ation; it shifts demand for goods
from foreign-produced goods to home-produced goods. In the foreign country, in￿ ation
rates drop, and monetary policy is accommodated. Net worth is improved, and cost-of-
capital declines, increasing GDP and investment in the foreign country. As we will show
soon, however, GDP and investment come to have positive bilateral correlations under
banking globalization.
In the BGG model, the FIs￿net worth shock has no e⁄ect on the economy. Because
FIs are not credit constrained, their net worth plays no role.
Entrepreneurial net worth shock Figure 13 illustrates economic responses to a
negative shock of entrepreneurial net worth in the home country. We consider a case in
which entrepreneurial net worth declines by one percent of the steady-state GDP.
We ￿nd ￿rst that GDP and investment are not synchronized. The shock to entrepre-
neurial net worth yields opposing responses of GDP and investment in the two countries.
Second, compared with Figure 12, for the decline in net worth of the same size, the en-
trepreneurial net worth shock has smaller impacts on GDP and investment than FIs￿net
worth shock. This result is in line with HSU and Figure 9. Third, compared with the
BGG model, our CCC model reports greater responses of GDP and investment in the
16two countries.
4.3.2 E⁄ects of Banking Globalization
Next, we consider an economy under banking globalization. FIs engage in both cross-
border lending and borrowing. The degree of banking globalization is characterized by
￿ = ￿F = ￿E = 0:1: We simulate impulse responses of economic variables in response to
the four types of adverse shocks.
Productivity shock Figure 14 plots GDP, investment, the sum of FIs￿and entrepre-
neurial net worth ratios in the two countries, and the real exchange rate. In addition,
Figure 15 plots the FIs￿net worth ratios, the entrepreneurial net worth ratios, the ex-
ternal ￿nance premiums, the price of capital (asset prices), and cross-border lending in
the two countries.22 Figures 14 and 15 illustrate that banking globalization, captured
by positive ￿, yields a larger spillover of the productivity shock in one country to the
other country. The two countries experience declines in GDP, investment, FIs￿net worth
ratios, and asset prices.
Two channels arise from banking globalization. The ￿rst is through the exchange rate.
In the home country, the real interest rate increases. The real exchange rate decreases,
meaning home appreciation and foreign depreciation. For FIs in the foreign country, it
binds the participation constraint of investors in the home country more severely. The
net worth ratio worsens and the cost-of-funds increases in the foreign country. GDP and
investment are thus dampened. Second, through a decrease in returns to capital, the
adverse shock in the home country damages the credit conditions of FIs in the home
country. Because those FIs lend funds to entrepreneurs in the foreign country, the cost-
of-funds increases for the entrepreneurs in the foreign country. It dampens GDP and
investment in the foreign country.
The second channel above is compared to the so-called common lender e⁄ect. This
e⁄ect arises when borrowers in multiple countries have a common lender. Suppose,
for example, that an adverse shock hits in one country. Then, the FI, the lender to
borrowers in the country, withdraws funds from another country; loans thus shrink in
multiple countries. Our model successfully captures this common lender e⁄ect. When ￿E
is non-zero, entrepreneurs in the two countries have a common lender. The adverse shock
in one country aggravates FIs￿net worth, raising cost-of-funds for foreign borrowers. The
common lender e⁄ect is absent in the BGG model because FIs are not credit constrained.
22Cross-border lending is in the unit of ￿nal consumption goods in the FIs￿country.
17The BGG model, therefore, yields a smaller spillover of the shock to the foreign country.
The result that banking globalization enhances business cycle synchronization is con-
sistent with empirical studies (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones [2003], Morgan, Strahan, and
Rime [2004], and Imbs [2004, 2006]).
The model￿ s prediction of simultaneous drops in ￿nancial and real variables is con-
sistent with the recent ￿nancial crisis shown in Figure 1. However, a decrease in an
external ￿nance premium in the foreign country and increases in cross-border lending
except for loans from foreign FIs to home entrepreneurs appear to be inconsistent with
those ￿gures.
Monetary policy shock As Figures 16 and 17 illustrate, for the monetary policy
shock, we obtain similar results to those for the productivity shock. First, the spillover
e⁄ect increases due to the banking globalization. GDP and investment in the foreign
country decline more. Second, our CCC model reports a larger spillover e⁄ect than the
BGG model.
FIs￿net worth shock Figures 18 and 19 illustrate that due to banking globalization,
the FIs￿net worth shock yields completely opposite movements of economic variables
in the foreign economy, compared with those without banking globalization. Without
banking globalization, the worsening of credit conditions of FIs in the home country
increases GDP and investment in the foreign country. Under banking globalization, the
common lender e⁄ect arises; the worsening of credit conditions of FIs in the home country
increases the cost-of-funds for entrepreneurs in the foreign country. It dampens GDP and
investment in the foreign country as well as in the home country. In response to adverse
FIs￿net worth shock, the two countries experience simultaneous economic downturns.
Compared with the responses to the productivity shock, the responses to the FIs￿net
worth shock are more consistent with our observations on the recent ￿nancial crisis that
are shown in Figure 1. The adverse FIs￿net worth shock dampens GDP, investment,
FIs￿net worth ratios, and asset prices in the two countries. It also dampens cross-
border lending except for loans from foreign FIs to home entrepreneurs, and increases
the external ￿nance premium in the two countries.
Entrepreneurial net worth shock Also for the entrepreneurial net worth shock, we
￿nd very di⁄erent movements of economic variables in the foreign economy between the
cases with and without banking globalization. Figures 20 and 21 suggest that on impact
the worsening of entrepreneurial net worth in the home country decreases investment
18in both of the countries. Due to the worsening of entrepreneurial net worth in the
home country, entrepreneurs￿defaults increase. FIs both in the home and the foreign
country thus pay higher monitoring costs, reducing their pro￿ts, and the FIs￿net worths
decrease in the two countries. It raises cost-of-funds for entrepreneurs in the foreign
country. Investment thus falls in the foreign country.
However, because the worsening in FIs￿net worth is not so large, declines in GDP
and investment in the foreign country are not as great as those in response to the same
size of shock to FIs￿net worth. While investment falls on impact in the foreign country,
its fall is not persistent and GDP increases on impact in the foreign country. As a result,
bilateral correlations for GDP and investment become negative.
4.4 Bilateral Correlations
Tables 5 and 6 report bilateral correlations for macroeconomic variables (GDP and in-
vestment, respectively) between the two countries. As before, we consider the four kinds
of adverse shocks: (1) a productivity shock; (2) a monetary policy shock; (3) a net worth
shock in the FI sector; and (4) a net worth shock in the entrepreneurial sector. In each
case, adverse shocks occur in both of the countries. A bilateral correlation for the shocks
is zero, but as we will see below, our model predicts positive bilateral correlations for
GDP and investment.23 For comparison, the tables report bilateral correlations predicted
by the BGG model in parentheses.
In the benchmark, predicted bilateral correlations are positive for aggregate shocks.
In response to the productivity shock, a bilateral correlation for GDP is 0.28 and a
bilateral correlation for investment is 0.53. In response to the monetary policy shock, a
bilateral correlation for GDP is 0.14 and a bilateral correlation for investment is 0.27.
Those bilateral correlations are greater than those in the BGG model, except for the
investment correlation in response to the monetary policy shock. For the other shocks,
bilateral correlations are almost zero. For example, for FIs￿net worth shock, a negative
bilateral correlation for GDP is -0.11.
Under banking globalization, predicted bilateral correlations become greater than
those without banking globalization in many cases. For the productivity shock, GDP
bilateral correlations increase from 0.28 to 0.41. For the monetary policy shock, GDP
bilateral correlations increase from 0.14 to 0.44. For FIs￿net worth shock, GDP bilateral
correlations increase from -0.11 to 0.30. Those increases are sharper in the CCC model
23Previous literature often assumed positive bilateral correlations for structural shocks. It is 0.3 for
the technology shock and 0.6 for the monetary policy shock in Faia (2007).
19than in the BGG model. Although investment bilateral correlations are lower in the
CCC model (0.27) than in the BGG model (0.38) without banking globalization, they
become higher in the CCC model (0.71) than in the BGG model (0.46) under banking
globalization.
To examine the e⁄ect of globalization in more detail, Figures 22 illustrates GDP
bilateral correlations for a wide range of openness parameter values. The horizontal
axis represents varying trade openness parameter values (￿), FIs￿borrowing openness
parameter values in the IF contract (￿F), and FIs￿lending openness parameter values
in the FE contract (￿E) with the other parameter values ￿xed. Each row represents
di⁄erent shocks. For the productivity shock and the monetary policy shock, bilateral
correlations increase, as either trade or ￿nancial openness increases. That increase is
steeper in the CCC model than in the BGG model. For the net worth shocks, changes
in trade and ￿nancial openness have small impacts on bilateral correlations, except for
one case: when FIs￿lending openness (￿E) changes. The slope of bilateral correlations
is the steepest of all the shocks and openness parameters. When ￿E = 0:5; the bilateral
correlation reaches one; GDPs in the two countries are perfectly correlated. Because FIs
in one country lend the same amount of funds to entrepreneurs in the two countries, FIs￿
net worth shock has equall impacts on the two countries.
Finally, we examine the e⁄ect of price stickiness. Its e⁄ect has already been discussed
brie￿ y in Section 4.3 and by Faia (2007). Faia (2007) extends a sticky-price BGG model
to a two-country model and suggests that price stickiness as well as the BGG-type
￿nancial friction contributes to business cycle synchronization. Regarding the CCC as
an extension to BGG, our earlier paper HSU (2009) constructs the closed-economy model
with a ￿ exible price and analyzes the basic property of the CCC.
Figures 23 illustrates GDP bilateral correlations for a wide range of openness para-
meter values, comparing those with and without sticky prices. We ￿nd three things.
First, without FIs￿globalization (￿F = ￿E = 0), a technology shock does not yield a
positive bilateral correlation for GDP. In this respect, price stickiness is essential to ac-
count for business cycle synchronization. This ￿nding is consistent with the discussions
made in Section 4.3 and by Faia (2007). Second, in the presence of FIs￿globalization
(either ￿F or ￿E); the technology shock yields business cycle synchronization. Third,
for a positive ￿E; the FIs￿net worth shock also yields business cycle synchronization.
The latter two points arise from the common lender e⁄ect and con￿rm our previous re-
sult that FIs￿globalization and credit constraints are important factors in business cycle
synchronization.
205 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a two-country model to explain business cycle synchronization
in the economy where the ￿nancial markets, the ￿nancial system, and the real economy
are linked globally. The model incorporates chained credit contracts between investors
and credit-constrained FIs as well as credit-constrained FIs and credit-constrained en-
trepreneurs. Under banking globalization, the FIs engage in cross-border lending and
borrowing, enhancing business cycle synchronization on both the real and ￿nancial sides.
We draw several implications. The ￿rst concerns the nature of the recent ￿nancial
crisis. Our simulation suggests that the net worth shock in the FI sector is an important
factor. This is because not the productivity shock but the net worth shock in the FI
sector accounts for a simultaneous decline in cross-border lending and rise in external
￿nance premiums, which are consistent with actual responses shown in Figure 1. Fur-
thermore, our simulation suggests that globalization is another important factor. In the
model, business cycle synchronization is enhanced as globalization intensi￿es. This is
consistent with our experiences in the 2000s. Compared with the bursting of the dot-
com bubble in 2000, the recent ￿nancial crisis had a broader impact. As Figures 3 to
6 illustrate, the underlying factor is rapid globalization, particularly in Europe. As a
result, many European countries such as Iceland and Ireland su⁄ered heavily from the
subprime mortgage problem that originated in the United States.24
The second implication concerns policy responses to a global ￿nancial crisis. As glob-
alization intensi￿es, policy has a greater global impact. In the recent ￿nancial crisis, the
Fed slashed its policy rates consecutively. Capital injection policy was implemented to
support the ￿nancial markets and the ￿nancial system. Our model suggests that under
banking globalization, those policy helps mitigate the downturn in foreign countries. Our
model may also provide a framework to analyze the e⁄ects of the pegged exchange rate
policy, the currency swap program that were implemented by central banks in collabo-
ration with the Fed, and the cross-border collateral arrangements that were introduced
by some central banks and proved to be resilient to adverse shocks in the recent episode.
24Japanese banks were relatively less damaged than U.S. and European banks, but the Japanese
economy experienced deep recessions. It is true that Japanese banks had less ￿nancial exposure than
European banks. However, as we discussed in calibration, Japan￿ s ￿nancial openness may reach 10
percent. Trade openness is not low, which shot up in the 2000s from 10 to 20 percent. Such economic
openness predicts strong bilateral correlations. For example, economic openness of ￿ = 0:2; ￿E = 0:065;
￿E = 0:035 yields a bilateral correlation for GDP as high as 0.43 in response to productivity shocks. It
accounts for about half of the observed correlation in the 2000s between Japan and the United States,
that is, 0.81. Considering that simulated productivity shocks are completely uncorrelated and equally
large in two countries, either correlated productivity shocks or the occurrence of extremely large shocks
in the U.S. economy yield a bilateral correlation that is even closer to the observed one.
21Finally, our model enables us to investigate developments in foreign assets and global
imbalances, and their e⁄ects on the ￿nancial market and the real economy.25 It would
be interesting for future research to investigate how welfare changes if two countries
with di⁄erent ￿nancial technology are interconnected with di⁄erent degrees of banking
globalization.
25See Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009).
22A Model
This Appendix describes the model in detail.
A.1 Credit Market
Environment
There is a continuum number of investors, FIs, and entrepreneurs in the home and
the foreign countries. FIs in the home country sign four credit contracts with investors
and entrepreneurs in the two countries. Two are the FE contracts with investors in the
two countries, and the other two are the IF contracts with entrepreneurs in the two
countries. In period t, investors collect deposits from a household for the risk-free rate in
the competitive market and lend these deposits to a continuum of FIs. R(st) and R￿ (st)
are the risk-free rate of return paid at the end of period t in the home country and in
the foreign country, respectively, where st is state of the economy in period t. Investors￿
returns on the loans to FIs are equalized to their opportunity cost given by the risk-free
rate. FIs monopolistically supply loans to a continuum of entrepreneurs. Each FI ￿say,
a type-i FI ￿makes loan contracts with speci￿c group of entrepreneurs ￿say, group-ji
entrepreneurs ￿that are attached to the FI.26 By lending to a continuum of group-ji
entrepreneurs, type-i FI in the home (foreign) country diversi￿es the loan risk associated
with a speci￿c entrepreneur and obtains a return of RF (st) (RF￿ (st)): Entrepreneurs are
￿nal borrowers in the economy. Entrepreneurs in the home (foreign) country invest their
loans in the purchase of capital goods and receive the return to capital RE
H (st) (RE￿
H (st))
for the home country and RE
F (st) (RE￿
F (st)) for the foreign country.
We de￿ne a degree of banking globalization, or ￿nancial openness, by the alloca-
tion of ￿nance between the home country and the foreign country, which is determined
exogenously. When entrepreneurs in the home country borrow funds, 1 ￿ ￿E
H of their
net worth NE (st) is used to borrow from the home FI and ￿E
H of their net worth to
borrow from the foreign FI. When entrepreneurs in the foreign country borrow funds,
1￿￿E
F of their net worth NE￿ (st) is used to borrow from the FI in the country (i.e., the
foreign country) and ￿E
F of their net worth to borrow from the FI in the other country
(i.e., the home country). FIs in the home country borrow a portion of 1 ￿ ￿F
H from the
home investors and ￿F
H from the foreign investors. FIs in the foreign country borrow a
portion of 1 ￿ ￿F
F from the investors in the country and ￿F
F from the investors in the
26We assume that the bankruptcy cost associated with a credit contract between FI other than type-i
FI and group-ji entrepreneurs is high enough. Therefore, group-ji entrepreneurs can borrow funds only
from a certain monopolistic FI.




F < 1 represent the degree of
banking globalization from FIs￿borrowing and lending sides: ￿F
H and ￿F
F capture the
degree of banking globalization from FIs￿borrowing side, or the ￿nancial openness of the
interbank market, and ￿E
H and ￿E
F capture the degree of banking globalization from FIs￿
lending side or the ￿nancial openness of foreign direct investment.
FE contract
We begin with the FE contract between FIs in the home country and entrepreneurs
in the home country. At the beginning of each period, each type-i FI in the home
country o⁄ers a loan contract to group-ji entrepreneurs in the home country. Each
entrepreneur in group ji owns net worth NE (st):28 It uses 1 ￿ ￿E
H of the net worth to
purchase capital of (1 ￿ ￿E
H)Q(st)KH (st), where Q(st) is the price paid to capital in
units of the household consumption index. (1 ￿ ￿E
H)KH (st) is the quantity of capital
purchased by a group-ji entrepreneur: Following BGG, we assume that entrepreneurs
are subject to an idiosyncratic productivity shock !E
H (st+1) so that the net return to
capital is !E
H (st+1)RE
H (st+1):29 The FE contract speci￿es (1) the amount of debt that
a group-ji entrepreneur borrows from type-i FI, (1 ￿ ￿E
H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st)); (2)
the cut-o⁄ value for the idiosyncratic shock !E
H (st+1);which we denote by !E
H (st+1jst);
such that entrepreneurs repay their debt for !E
H (st+1) ￿ !E
H (st+1jst) and declare the
default for !E
H (st+1) < !E
H (st+1jst); and (3) a loan rate that group-ji entrepreneurs repay
when they do not default, ZE









H (st+1)Q(st)KH (st) and the default entrepreneur
receives nothing from the contract.
There is a participation constraint for entrepreneurs in the FE contract. Instead of
participating in the FE contract, group-ji entrepreneurs can purchase capital goods using
their own net worth NE (st);without participating in loan contracts with FIs. In this al-
27In equilibrium, investors￿and FIs￿returns from investing in the home country equal those from
investing in the foreign country. Up to the ￿rst order, therefore, the portfolio choice becomes indetermi-
nate, and we set the portfolio exogenously. To endogenize the optimal portfolio choice of each country￿ s
investors, a second-order approximation might be needed as in Dedola and Lombardo (2009), Devereux
and Sutherland (2009), and Devereux and Yetman (2009). However, our model is more complex, be-
cause investors, FIs, and entrepreneurs are risk neutral, and goods are traded by debt contracts with
defaults. Also note that although the allocation of net worth used for borrowing from home and foreign
lenders is exogenous, the allocation of borrowings between the two lenders is endogenously determined.
28Net worth depends on group ji; but in what follows we do not indicate the subscript of ji for
simplicity. The same applies to capital K and idiosyncratic productivity shock !:
29FI￿ s idiosyncratic productivity shock !F
i is associated with the shock in bankruptcy costs, technol-
ogy of ￿nancing short-term assets and liabilities, or the quality of borrowers in the FE contract that
di⁄ers across FIs. We assume that !F
i is a unit mean, lognormal random variable distributed inde-






; and its cumulative











Therefore, an FE contract between an FI and entrepreneurs is agreed only when the fol-
lowing inequality is expected to hold:
































































portion of non-defaulted borrowers














Note that 1 ￿ ￿E
t is the expected share of pro￿ts from purchasing capital goods that
goes to the borrowers in the FE contract. The left-hand side of the inequality (3) shows
the expected return from the FE contract for group-ji entrepreneurs, and the right-hand
side of the inequality (3) shows the expected return from investing the entrepreneurial
net worth NE (st): Credit contracts are signed only when the inequality holds.
Similarly, a participation constraint for entrepreneurs in the FE contract between FIs
in the home country and entrepreneurs in the foreign country is described as











































Variables with the superscript ￿ correspond to those in the foreign country. For example,
￿E
HK￿
H (st) represents the quantity of capital purchased by entrepreneurs in the foreign
25country using loans from the FI in the home country. Q￿ (st) is the price paid to capital
in units of the household consumption index in the foreign country.
The inequality (3) and (4) gives the expression for the expected earnings of a type-i
FI from each of the FE contract


































































where e(st) represents a real exchange rate. The ￿rst term indicates earnings from
the FE contract with entrepreneurs in the home country. The second term indicates
earnings from the FE contract with entrepreneurs in the foreign country. The earnings
are converted from units of the household consumption index in the foreign country to
units of the household consumption index in the home country with their relative price
















A parameter ￿ (0 < ￿ < 1) represents the parameter of monitoring costs. In particular,




F: The parameter ￿E
H (￿E
F) represents the
cost to monitor entrepreneurs by FIs in the home (foreign) country. The parameter ￿F
H
(￿F
F) represents the cost to monitor FIs by investors in the home (foreign) country.
Because each type-i FI lends a continuum number of entrepreneurs in group ji; the
loan risk of the FI is perfectly diversi￿ed. For convenience, we de￿ne the expected return













































































H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿






The left-hand side of equation (5) is the gross pro￿t that a speci￿c type-i FI receives from
26a continuum number of FE contracts with group-ji entrepreneurs in the two countries.
On the right-hand side of the equation, ￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿
H (st) ￿ NE￿ (st)) represents
loans to entrepreneurs in the foreign country in units of the household consumption
index in the home country.
The relationship between the cut-o⁄value !E
H (st+1jst) and non-default entrepreneurs￿
loan rate ZE












































Similarly, for the FE contract between FIs in the home country and entrepreneurs in the


















































We next turn to the IF contract. A type-i FI splits these gross pro￿ts from the FE
contract with investors according to another credit contract, the IF contract. The IF
contract has the same costly state veri￿cation structure as does the FE contract, whereas
FIs now need to act as the borrowers rather than lenders. In the IF contract, investors
lend the loans to a continuum number of FIs. Each type-i FI in the home country owns
the net worth NF (st); and invests in the loans to group-ji entrepreneurs in the home
country an amount (1￿￿E
H)(Q(st)KH (st)￿NE (st)) and group-ji entrepreneurs in the
foreign country an amount ￿E
F(Q￿ (st)K￿
H (st) ￿ NE￿ (st)): The type-i FI then borrows
the rest from investors in the home country by a portion of 1 ￿ ￿F
H and investors in
the foreign country by a portion of ￿F
H. It repays the loan using its pro￿t from the
FE contracts. We assume that the type-i FI is subject to an idiosyncratic productivity
shock !F
H (st+1) 30 and its ex post gross return on the loans to entrepreneurs is given by
!F
H (st+1)RF (st+1): Here, the IF contract speci￿es (1) the amount of debt that the type-i
FI borrows from investors; (2) the cut-o⁄value for the idiosyncratic shock !F
H (st+1) and
!F￿
H (st+1); which we denote by !F
H (st+1jst) and !F￿
H (st+1jst); such that FIs repay their
debt for !F
H (st+1) ￿ !F
H (st+1jst) and declare the default for !F
H (st+1) < !F
H (st+1jst);
30We assume that two variables !E
ji and !F
i are unit mean, lognormal random variables distrib-
uted independently over time and across entrepreneurs and FIs. We express the density function of






























Similar to the FE contract, there is a participation constraint for the investors in
the IF contract. Given the risk-free rate of return in the economy R(st) and R￿ (st);
investors￿pro￿t from the investment in the loans to the FIs must equal the opportunity























H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿












H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿

























H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿















H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿
H (st) ￿ NE￿ (st)) ￿ NF (st)
)
: (9)








share of FIs earnings paid to FIs






















H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿










share of FIs earnings paid to FIs






















H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿
H (st) ￿ NE￿ (st))
)
; (10)
where ￿(st+1jst) is a probability weight for state st+1; depending on the information set
available at period t:
Equations (5), (8), and (9) give equation (1) in the main text. To be more precise,
the external ￿nance premium depends on other variables such as the real exchange rate
and the risk-free rate in the other country.
The relationship between the cut-o⁄ values !F
H (st+1jst) and !F￿
H (st+1jst) and non-
default FIs￿loan rates ZF
H (st+1jst) and ZF￿
















H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿












H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿


















H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿












H)(Q(st)KH (st) ￿ NE (st))
+￿E
Fe(st)(Q￿ (st)K￿




Expected returns to capital RE
H (st+1jst) and RE￿
H (st+1jst) are derived by solving the
optimal credit contract. RE
H (st+1jst) and RE￿
H (st+1jst) are hereafter called cost-of-funds.
They represent the cost for entrepreneurs in the home country to borrow funds from FIs in
the home country and FIs in the foreign country, respectively. A di⁄erence of RE
H (st+1jst)
and RE￿
H (st+1jst) from the risk-free rate is called the external ￿nance premium. A type-i





H ; KH; K￿
H; subject to the investors￿participation constraints





































































































































































































































































In the contract with entrepreneurs in the home country, the ratio of capital KH to
net worth is the same across FIs and entrepreneurs. Similarly, in the contract with
entrepreneurs in the foreign country, the ratio of capital K￿
H to net worth is the same
across FIs and entrepreneurs. That facilitates aggregation.
Dynamic behavior of net worth
The net worths of FIs and entrepreneurs, NF (st) and NE (st); depend on their
earnings from the credit contracts and their labor income. In addition to the pro￿ts
30from entrepreneurial projects, both FIs and entrepreneurs inelastically supply a unit
of labor to wholesale goods producers and receive labor income W F (st) and W E (st).
We assume that each FI and entrepreneur survives to the next period with a constant
































































H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿























H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿
































































FIs and entrepreneurs that fail to survive at period t consume
￿
1 ￿ ￿F￿
V F (st) and
￿
1 ￿ ￿E￿
V E (st); respectively. Following Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), we consider "nF (st)
and "nE (st), once-and-for-all changes in the FI￿ s and entrepreneurial net worth.
A.2 Goods Market
Household




























































































where CH (st) and CF (st) denote the consumption of home-produced goods spent in
the home country and the consumption of foreign-produced goods spent in the home
















W (st) is the real wage in units of the household consumption index, and T (st) is the
lump-sum transfer. R(st) and R￿ (st) are the real risk-free return from the deposit
D(st) and B￿ (st) between time t and t + 1. Parameters ￿ 2 (0;1); ￿1; and ￿2 are the
subjective discount factor, the elasticity of leisure, and the utility weight on leisure. A
parameter ￿ represents the elasticity of substitution between home-produced goods and
foreign-produced goods. Bond markets are complete; bonds are contingent on the set of
aggregate states. The ratio of the marginal utility of consumption in the home country
to the marginal utility of consumption in the foreign country becomes proportional to
the real exchange rate. D(st) is real domestic deposits held by investors, and B￿ (st) is
real foreign deposits held by investors.
Trade openness is captured by ￿H: The parameter ￿H represents the weight on foreign-
produced goods. Similarly, we de￿ne the weight on home-produced goods in the foreign
country as ￿F. Those parameters indicate the inverse degree of a home bias.
Final goods producer
The ￿nal goods YH (st) are composites along a continuum of retail goods YH (h;st):
The ￿nal goods producer purchases retails goods in the competitive market and sells
the output to a household and capital producers with price PH (st). The production
































The retail goods producers h 2 [0;1] are populated over a unit interval, each produc-










where yH (h;st) for h 2 [0;1] are the wholesale goods that is used for producing the
retail goods YH (h;st) by the retail goods producer h 2 [0;1]: The retail goods producers
are price takers in the input market and choose their inputs taking the input price
P(st)=XH (st) as given. They are monopolistic suppliers in their output market, and
















The retail goods producers are subject to nominal rigidity. They can change prices
in a given period only with probability (1 ￿ ￿); according to Calvo-type price stickiness.
Denoting the price set by the active retail goods producers by P O
H (h;st), retailer h ￿ s
optimization problem with respect to its products￿price P O

































Using equations (22);(23); and (24); ￿nal goods YH (st) produced in period t are






































Because of the stickiness of the retail goods price, the aggregate price index for the














The wholesale goods producers produce wholesale goods yH (st) and sell them to
the retail goods producers with the relative price 1=XH (st): They hire three types of
labor inputs H (st); HF (st); and HE (st); and capital K (st￿1): Those labor inputs are
supplied by household, FIs, and entrepreneurs for wages W (st); W F (st); and W E (st);
respectively. Capital is supplied by home (foreign) entrepreneurs with the rental price
RE
H (st) (RE
F (st)). At the end of each period, the capital is sold back to the entrepreneurs
at price Q(st): The price of a unit of capital Q(st) is the same for KH (st￿1) and






















































































by borrowing funds from FIs in the home country and FIs in















































denotes the level of technology of wholesale production. ￿ 2 (0;1],
￿; ￿F; and ￿E are the depreciation rate of capital goods, the capital share, the share of
FIs￿labor inputs, and the share of entrepreneurial labor inputs.
Capital goods producer
The capital goods producers own the technology that converts ￿nal goods to capi-
tal goods. In each period, capital goods producers in the home country purchase I (st)
amounts of ￿nal goods from the ￿nal goods producers in the home country. In addition,
they purchase K (st￿1)(1 ￿ ￿) of used capital goods from the entrepreneurs in the home
country at price Q(st). They then produce new capital goods K (st); using the tech-
nology FI; and sell them in the competitive market at price Q(st): Consequently, the






















































Note that ￿ is a parameter associated with investment technology with an adjustment































entrepreneurs at the end of the period. This is because we assume, following BGG, that the price of old
capital that the entrepreneurs sell to the capital goods producers, say Q(st); is close to the price of the
newly produced capital Q(st) around the steady state.





































H (st) and CE￿
H (st) represent the consumption of home-produced goods spent in
the home country and the foreign country, respectively. In order to isolate the asymmetry
arising from di⁄erences in monitoring costs and consumption by entrepreneurs and FIs,
we assume that monitoring costs and consumption by entrepreneurs and FIs are spent



































































































H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿






















H(Q(st￿1)KF (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+(1 ￿ ￿E
F)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿













The ￿rst two terms on the right-hand side of the equation correspond to the bankruptcy
costs spent by FIs. The third and the fourth terms correspond to the bankruptcy costs
incurred by investors. The last two equations are the FIs￿and entrepreneurial consump-
tion. Similarly, CE￿
H (st) and Y E￿ (st) are de￿ned.
A.3 Rest of the Economy
Government
The government collects lump-sum tax from the household T (st); and spends G(st).











The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate Rn (st); according to a stan-

























where ￿ is the autoregressive parameter of the policy rate, ￿￿ and ￿y are the policy
weight on in￿ ation rate of ￿nal home-produced goods, and output gap log(Y (st)=Y );
respectively. ￿H (st) denotes the in￿ ation rate of home-produced goods at period t, that
is, ￿H (st) = PH (st)=PH (st￿1):
Because the monetary authority determines the nominal interest rate, the real interest











￿ (st) denotes the aggregate in￿ ation rate at period t, that is, ￿ (st) = P (st)=P (st￿1):
Exogenous variables
The exogenous shocks to the model are the productivity shock, the monetary policy
shock, FIs￿net worth shock, and entrepreneurial net worth shock. The productivity














where ￿A 2 (0;1) is the autoregressive root. "A (st); "R (st); "nF (st); and "nE (st) are in-
novations that are mutually independent, serially uncorrelated, and normally distributed
with mean zero, respectively.
37B Summary of the Model
This Appendix summarizes the model described in Appendix A. For the optimization
problems, we report their ￿rst-order conditions. All the necessary equations are provided
to ￿nd equilibrium solutions in the home country . The equations in the foreign country




































































H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿






















































H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿



















































H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿
H (st￿1) ￿ NE￿ (st￿1))
)
: (42)












































































































































































































































































































































H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿

















H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿




































































































































































































H)(Q(st￿1)KH (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+￿E
Fe(st￿1)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿














H(Q(st￿1)KF (st￿1) ￿ NE (st￿1))
+(1 ￿ ￿E
F)(Q￿ (st￿1)K￿



































































































































































































































































































(1 + ￿H (st+1))
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"+1






















































































































































This Appendix provides parameterization of the variables associated with household,
wholesalers, capital goods producers, retailers, ￿nal goods producers, government and
monetary authority. Following precedent studies including BGG and Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2004), we choose conventional values for these parameters.
Parameters33
Parameter Value Description
￿ 0.99 Discount factor
￿ 0.025 Depreciation rate
￿ 0.35 Capital share
R 0.99￿1 Risk-free rate
￿ 6 Degree of substitutability
￿ 0.75 Probability that price cannot be adjusted
￿1 3 Elasticity of labor
￿ 2.5 Adjustment cost of investment
￿ 1
Elasticity of substitution between
home produced goods and foreign produced goods
￿F;￿E 0.01 Share of FIs￿and entrepreneurial labor inputs
￿ 0.8 Autoregressive parameter for the policy rate
￿a 0.85 Autoregressive parameter for TFP
￿￿ 1.5 Policy weight on in￿ ation
￿y 0 Policy weight on output gap
33Figures are quarterly unless otherwise noted.
44C.2 Parameterization II (Globalization)
Globalization parameters in the benchmark
￿H 0.15 Trade openness in the home country
￿E
H 0 Banking globalization in FIs￿lending to entrepreneurs in the home country
￿F
H 0 Banking globalization in FIs￿borrowing in the home country
￿F 0.15 Trade openness in the foreign country
￿E
F 0 Banking globalization in FIs￿lending to entrepreneurs in the foreign country
￿F
F 0 Banking globalization in FIs￿borrowing in the foreign country
45C.3 Parameterization III (Credit Market)
Regarding the parameters in the credit market, we set values for six parameters that are
linked to the IF contract and FE contract so that these values are consistent with the
following seven conditions. These are as follows: (1) the risk spread, RE ￿ R; equal to
200 basis points annually; (2) the ratio of net worth held by FIs to capital, NF=QK, is
0.1, which is close to the actual value according to the data;34 (3) the ratio of net worth
held by entrepreneurs to capital, NE=QK, is 0.5, the approximate value in the data; (4)
the annualized failure rate of FIs is two percent;35 and (5) the annualized failure rate of
entrepreneurs is two percent. Conditions (1), (3), and (5) are the same as those used in
BGG. Two more conditions are set to be approximately consistent with the U.S. data:
(6) the spread between the FIs￿loan rate and the FIs￿borrowing rate ZE ￿ ZF equals
230 basis points annually, which equals the historical average spread between the prime
lending rate and the six-month certi￿cate of deposit rate from 1980 to 2006; and (7) the
spread between the FIs￿borrowing rate and risk-free rate ZF ￿R equals 60 basis points
annually, which turns out to be approximately the historical average spread between the
six-month certi￿cates of deposit rate and the six-month Treasury bill rate from 1980 to
2006.
The estimated parameters from those steady-state conditions include the lenders￿
bankruptcy cost in the IF contract ￿F
H and ￿F
F, the lenders￿bankruptcy cost in the FE
contract ￿E
H and ￿E
F; the standard error of the idiosyncratic productivity shock in the
FI sector ￿F
H and ￿F
F, the standard error of the idiosyncratic productivity shock in the
entrepreneurial sector ￿E
H and ￿E
F, the survival rate of FIs ￿F
H and ￿F
F; and the survival
rate of entrepreneurs ￿E
H and ￿E
F.
34We calculate the steady-state value of NE=QK based on the Flow of Funds data, released by the
Federal Reserve Board. We calculate the historical series of the sum of corporate equities and equity in
noncorporate business held by ￿nancial sectors divided by total liability and equity of the non￿nancial
business sector, and set at the steady-state value of 0.1 for NE=QK, which is the historical average from
1990 to 2005.
35Although the FI￿ s failure rate may seem to be lower than the entrepreneur￿ s failure rate, we set
them to this value based on the observation of the CDS premium data during the recent crisis periods.
46Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description
￿F 0.107 S.E. of FIs￿idiosyncratic productivity at steady state
￿E 0.313 S.E. of entrepreneurial idiosyncratic productivity at steady state
￿F
H; ￿F
F 0.033 Bankruptcy (monitoring) cost associated with FIs
￿E
H; ￿E
F 0.013 Bankruptcy (monitoring) cost associated with entrepreneurs
￿F 0.963 Survival rate of FIs
￿E 0.984 Survival rate of entrepreneurs
Steady state conditions
Condition Description
R = 0.99￿1 Risk-free rate
ZE = ZF + 0:023:25 FIs￿loan rate








= 0:02 Default probability in the FE contract
nF = 0:1 FIs￿net worth/capital ratio
nE = 0:5 Entrepreneurial net worth/capital ratio
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52Table 1: Regressions of GDP Changes on Cross-Border Lending in the Recent
Financial Crisis (OECD countries)
Dependent variable GDP changes from 2007 to 2009







(ratio to nominal GDP, as of 2006Q4)
-0.019
(-1.90)
Changes in cross-border lending
( ratio to nominal GDP,




Adjusted R2 0.08 0.12
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate t-statistics. Luxemburg is excluded.
Table 2: Observed Bilateral Correlations for GDP
1970Q1 to 2008Q4
U.S. Japan Germany France Italy U.K. Canada
Japan 0.23 - - - - - -
Germany 0.18 0.29 - - - - -
France 0.50 0.29 0.49 - - - -
Italy 0.34 0.56 0.37 0.66 - - -
U.K. 0.65 0.23 0.05 0.49 0.51 - -
Canada 0.75 0.14 0.01 0.46 0.51 0.62 -
Euro area 0.36 0.57 0.82 0.73 0.89 0.64 0.53
Note: Detrended with Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter
Source: IMF, ￿ InternationalFinancialStatistics.￿
53Table 3: Observed Bilateral Correlations for Investment
1970Q1 to 2008Q4
U.S. Japan Germany France Italy U.K. Canada
Japan 0.29 - - - - - -
Germany 0.26 0.41 - - - - -
France 0.31 0.59 0.57 - - - -
Italy 0.18 0.55 0.48 0.64 - - -
U.K. 0.43 0.37 0.04 0.42 0.44 - -
Canada 0.41 0.25 -0.05 0.34 0.25 0.48 -
Euro area 0.54 0.73 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.68 0.52
Note: Detrended with Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter.
Source: IMF, ￿ International Financial Statistics.￿
Table 4: Observed Bilateral Correlations for GDP
for Di⁄erent Samples
U.S. ￿Japan U.S. ￿Germany Japan ￿Germany
1970Q1 to 2008Q4 0.23 0.18 0.29
1970Q1 to 1979Q4 0.18 0.75 0.30
1980Q1 to 1989Q4 0.19 0.08 0.12
1990Q1 to 1999Q4 -0.33 -0.49 0.26
2000Q1 to 2008Q4 0.81 0.56 0.65
Note: Detrended with Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter.
Source: IMF, ￿ International Financial Statistics.￿


















0.41 (0.21) 0.44 (0.16) 0.30 (￿ ) -0.05 (-0.00)
:
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate bilateral correlations predicted by the BGG model.


















0.81 (0.38) 0.71 (0.46) 0.42 (￿ ) 0.09 (0.20)
:

























































Figure 1-1: Global Downturns in the Recent Financial Crisis (1)
Note: Cross-border lending is de￿ned as consolidated foreign claims on an immediate
borrowers basis.





















































Corporate bond spreads (BBB) (%)
Figure 1-2: Global Downturns in the Recent Financial Crisis (2)
Note: FIs￿net worth is de￿ned as ￿ corporate equities + equity in the noncorpo-
rate business sector￿held by the ￿nancial business sector. Corporate bond spreads are
di⁄erences between corporate bond rates and government bond rates.
Sources: Bloomberg; Federal Reserve, ￿ Flow of Funds Accounts￿ ; Bank of Japan,
￿ Flow of Funds Accounts￿ ; European Central Bank, ￿ Euro Area Integrated Economic
and Financial Accounts.￿
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Figure 2: Cross-Border Lending versus GDP Changes in the
Recent Financial Crisis (OECD countries)
Note: Cross-border lending is de￿ned as consolidated foreign claims on an immediate
borrowers basis. Luxemburg is excluded.
Sources: IMF, ￿ International Financial Statistics￿ ; IMF, ￿ World Economic Outlook￿ ;


















Figure 3: Trade Openness
Note: Trade openness is de￿ned as (exports + imports)/2 as a share of GDP (per-
cent).








































(ratio to non-financial firms' total liabilities, %)
Figure 4: Cross-Border Lending
Note: Cross-border lending is de￿ned as consolidated foreign claims on an immediate
borrower basis. The middle panel indicates the ratio of consolidated claims to nomi-
nal GDP at the end of the calendar year. The ￿gure for 2009 is that of June 2009.
The bottom panel indicates the ratio of consolidated claims to non-￿nancial ￿rms￿total
liabilities.
Sources: BIS, ￿ Consolidated International Banking Statistics￿ ; IMF, ￿ World Eco-
nomic Outlook￿ ; Federal Reserve, ￿ Flow of Funds Accounts￿ ; Bank of Japan, ￿ Flow of
































































(trillions of US dollars)
Figure 5: Cross-Border Lending to the Non-Bank Private Sector (left
panel) and Banks (right panel).
Note: Cross-border lending is de￿ned as consolidated international claims on an
immediate borrower basis.
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Figure 6: Channels of Fund-Raising by the
Non￿nancial Sector
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Figure 23: GDP Bilateral Correlations under Sticky and Flexible Price
Models
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